A well-known theory (Lazear, 1979) argues that wage patterns in which younger workers are underpaid relative to marginal revenue product and older workers are overpaid relative to marginal revenue product can be understood as an implicit contract designed to combat principal-agent problems in environments where worker monitoring is costly. In this paper I argue that a number of recent developments (most notably the legal ban on mandatory retirement) have caused the formation of these implicit contracts between firms and young workers to decline (or cease). I derive testable implications of this hypothesis and test it using a Panel Study of Income Dynamics sample of prime-age, full-time, private sector, non-union male workers who are not self-employed. This is the group that, according to Lazear's theory, is most likely to be party to these implicit contracts. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. In order to explore the question of whether the results from the main sample have some cause other than the hypothesized one, I perform the following exercise: I identify other groups in the data (both sub-groups of the main (male) sample and a separate female sample); determine what the hypothesis predicts for those groups; and then perform tests similar to those performed on the main sample to see how well the hypothesis holds up. The results from the male sub-groups do not support the hypothesis, but do not strongly refute it. This lack of support may indicate that the hypothesis is false, but it also may be due to the crudeness of the method for assigning workers to the different sub-groups. The results from the female sample support the hypothesis, but the strength of this support depends on the regression specification used.
I. Introduction:
In a well-known article, Lazear (1979) develops a model in which certain types of workers enter into implicit contracts with their employers (hereafter termed "Lazear-Style Implicit Contracts" or LSICs). Under the terms of these LSICs workers are underpaid early in their careers (relative to their marginal revenue product) and overpaid late in their careers. The theory purports to explain the existence of mandatory retirement and the fact that wages often increase more quickly than does productivity. 1 Lazear's theory has been tested empirically (Lazear, 1979; Lazear & Moore, 1984; Goldin, 1986; Hutchens, 1987; Hellerstein, Neumark, & Troske, 1999; Lazear, 2000) , and has amassed a substantial degree of support. The purpose of this paper is to develop and test (using more recent data) the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The formation of LSICs between firms and new entrants into the labor market has declined (or ceased).
In his original (1979) paper, Lazear argued that a mandatory retirement provision was necessary for the formation of LSICs. If this were true, then the amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1978 and 1986 (which made almost all forms of mandatory retirement illegal) should have been sufficient to bring about the hypothesized result.
1 For a summary of the theory and its implications, see Lazear (2000) . 2 Hellerstein, Neumark, & Troske (1999) find that wages generally track productivity, which is inconsistent with the existence of LSICs. But their data come only from the manufacturing sector, which may be less likely to employ LSICs.
But later theoretical work by Lazear (1983) showed that a properly designed defined-benefit pension plan can serve as a substitute for a mandatory retirement provision in an LSIC. It is therefore possible for LSICs to persist despite the ban on mandatory retirement. But the massive shift in recent years away from defined-benefit plans in favor of defined-contribution plans (which cannot support LSICs) seems to suggest that this has not happened.
Why have defined-benefit plans not been employed to "rescue" LSICs? First, such a rescue is costly. A variety of factors influence the optimal structure of a defined-benefit pension plan.
Modifying the (formerly optimal) plan in order to make it support LSICs must entail some costs.
Second, it may be that the benefits of LSICs are not as great as they once were.
One problem with LSICs is that they tend to inhibit efficient separations. A worker who is party to an LSIC may have an incentive to remain with his 3 current job instead of moving to a job in which he is more productive because he is expecting a future overpayment from his current employer. Similarly, a firm may retain a worker (particularly an older worker) that it wishes to dismiss for fear of acquiring a reputation for reneging. 4 Since LSICs tend to limit efficient separations, anything that makes efficient separations more likely (i.e., anything that makes workers or firms more likely to prefer to separate), reduces the benefits of LSICs and so makes them less likely to be formed. A worker who expects that he will want to leave his job, or will be compelled to leave, is less likely to be willing to enter into an LSIC. Efficient separations are more likely when workers find moving less distasteful, because alternative job offers are more likely to be perceived as superior. They are also more likely when firms have access to technologies and/or organizational structures that rely less heavily on firm-specific human capital.
LSICs contribute to positive measured returns to firm tenure (i.e., they contribute to the positive effect of an increase in firm tenure on wages). An implication of the Hypothesis, therefore, is that firm tenure should decline. A further implication is that this decline should be greater for less experienced workers. To see this, consider two dates: one shortly before the hypothesized effect began and one shortly after. The incidence of LSICs among experienced workers will be the same on these two dates, while the incidence of LSICs for new entrants to the labor force will be smaller at the later date. This means that, all else equal, the returns to firm tenure among older workers should be the same on the two dates, whereas returns to firm tenure among younger workers should be lower in the later period.
This empirical implication can be taken to the data: the main test of the Hypothesis consists of using a 1981-1992 sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate a wage equation for the main sample (prime-age, full-time, private sector, non-union male workers who are not self-employed). This is the group that, according to Lazear's theory, is most likely to be party to LSICs. In order to explore the question of whether the main results have some cause other than the hypothesized one, I perform the following exercise: I identify other groups in the data (both sub-groups of the full (male) sample and a separate female sample); determine what the Hypothesis predicts for those groups; and then perform empirical tests similar to those performed on the main sample to see how well the Hypothesis holds up.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a background to Lazear's theory; Section III develops the Hypothesis that the formation of LSICs with new entrants to the labor force has declined or ceased; Section IV develops testable empirical implications of the Hypothesis; Section V describes the data and provides summary statistics;
Section VI describes the estimation procedure and presents the main empirical results; Section VII discusses alternative possible explanations for the main empirical results and presents additional results; and Section VIII concludes.
II. Theoretical Background:
There is evidence that tenure-earnings profiles have steeper slopes than tenure-productivity profiles. (Medoff & Abraham 1980 , 1981 Kotlikoff & Gokhale, 1992) . This suggests that something other than human capital accumulation may be driving observed tenure-earnings profiles. 5 Lazear (1979) develops a theory in which tenure-earnings profiles 6 that are steeper than tenure-productivity profiles are a property of implicit contracts that exist between workers and firms.
These implicit contracts exist to address the following effort-elicitation problem: 7 suppose that the efficient labor contract (i.e., the contract that maximizes total social surplus) would stipulate high employee effort and high pay. Ideally, workers and firms could write a contract with these features. The problem, however, is that some types of workers are difficult to monitor so it is difficult to detect shirking by these workers. There is no full-employment equilibrium in which such workers are paid a wage equal to what their spot marginal revenue product (MRP)
would be if they exerted high effort. If this were the prevailing wage rate, all workers would 5 Other possible explanations for this phenomenon have been suggested. Social norms of fairness may dictate that workers should "move up the ladder" as they acquire greater tenure. Alternatively, workers may desire rising consumption over their lifetimes but be unable to discipline themselves to save (Neumark, 1995) . 6 Discussions of Lazear's theory have alternately referred to age-earnings profiles, experience-earnings profiles, and tenure-earnings profiles. In the context of the theory, these are all equivalent because workers are assumed to remain with the same firm for their entire careers. But the focus is rightly on firm tenure because LSICs involve the relationship between the worker and the specific firm. 7 Actually, this mechanism can be employed to combat any kind of principal-agent problem where the agent's actions are not fully observable to the principal.
shirk since they would know that if they were caught and fired, they could find another job at the same wage. In light of this fact, firms would be unwilling to offer that wage. If workers are unable to commit to high effort, then both workers and firms will be forced into inefficient contracts which are characterized either by worker shirking (and a correspondingly low wage) or by a high level of costly monitoring.
Lazear argues that LSICs arose to combat this problem. Workers are paid below their MRP in the early years of their careers. The difference between pay and MRP in the early years of a career is held by the firm as a "bond" and is repaid in the form of compensation above MRP in the later years if the worker is still employed by the firm. If the worker shirks and is fired, he forfeits the bond.
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Using LSICs to induce employee effort can be superior to exclusive reliance on employee monitoring. Firms can maintain a given level of deterrent by making the tenure-earnings profile steeper (which makes the performance "bond" larger) and making an appropriate reduction in the probability of catching shirkers (i.e., by monitoring less).
There is a limit to the extent that LSICs can be used as a substitute for monitoring because steeper tenure-earnings profiles make it more difficult for firms to credibly commit to honoring their commitments to older workers. Furthermore, in order to attract workers, firms using LSICs will have to offer higher expected pay as compensation for the risk that the firm will renege.
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For this reason, (feasible) LSICs are not always superior to costly monitoring. Since LSICs and monitoring are substitutes, the theory predicts that LSICs will be more attractive (and more common) in occupations where employee effort is more difficult to monitor.
Lazear's theory has been tested by a number of researchers (Lazear, 1979; Lazear & Moore, 1984; Goldin, 1986; Hutchens, 1987; Hellerstein, Neumark, & Troske, 1999; Lazear, 2000) . The evidence, while mixed, provides a measure of empirical support for the theory.
III. The Decline or Demise of LSICs:
The purpose of this section is to present arguments in favor of the proposition that the costs associated with LSICs have increased and the benefits have decreased. This proposition, if correct, leads directly to the Hypothesis of the paper: that the formation of LSICs between firms and young workers has declined or ceased.
A. Increasing Costs of LSICs
In his original 1979 paper, Lazear argues that mandatory retirement provisions are necessary in order to sustain LSICs, and can be understood to exist for this purpose. Workers and firms bargain ex-ante to an efficient LSIC, in which the separation between the worker and the firm takes place at the efficient date (when the worker's MRP drops below the value of time spent in retirement). But the LSIC must make retirement mandatory at the efficient date. Otherwise the worker will choose not to retire at the efficient date as his pay at that date would exceed his MRP, and therefore would exceed the value of time spent in retirement. If the worker did not retire, then the size of the repayment (in the form of overpayment when old) would exceed the amount of the bond (in the form of underpayment when young). This would make firms unwilling to enter into LSICs. In other words, mandatory retirement is a device that allows the 9 Reneging can be exogenous (the firm might go out of business), and it can also be endogenous (some firms receive a particularly high benefit from reneging).
worker to credibly commit not to engage in behavior that, rationally anticipated by the firm, would make it unwilling to enter into the (mutually beneficial) LSIC.
In recent years the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has been amended in ways that essentially outlaw mandatory retirement in the United States. In 1978, mandatory retirement below age 70 was banned. In 1986 it was banned altogether in almost all occupations.
Mandatory retirement can therefore no longer serve as a device to support LSICs. In his original (1979) paper, Lazear argues against the legal ban on mandatory retirement for exactly this reason.
The elimination of mandatory retirement does not make LSICs impossible. In principle, the LSIC could be structured to induce retirement at the efficient date by including a provision for a large wage cut at that date. This is probably not feasible, however; firms will not want to enter into such an arrangement since they know that it would be costly to actually make these wage cuts when the time came (possibly because workers cannot credibly promise not to agitate against these wage cuts when they arrive). 10 LSICs can also be effectuated without mandatory retirement through a properly designed defined-benefit 11 pension plan. Lazear (1983) shows that defined-benefit pension plans can be structured in such a way as to induce employees to retire at a specific date. 12 The ban on mandatory retirement does, however, make LSICs more costly.
Adjusting the terms of defined-benefit pension plans entails some costly deviation from the 10 In principle, it is possible to design a self-enforcing LSIC without wage cuts, but it would involve inefficiently late retirement. Nevertheless, it might still be worthwhile in cases where LSICs are particularly valuable. 11 A defined-benefit pension is one in which a retiree's pension payment (which continues until the retiree's death), is determined by a formula that typically includes years of service and salary. A defined-contribution pension is essentially a savings plan to which the employee and (sometimes) the employer contribute. The key difference, for the purposes of this paper, is that defined-benefit plans influence retirement decisions much more directly than do defined-contribution plans. 12 While that paper was concerned with early retirement (i.e., retirement before the agreed-upon mandatory retirement date), the same mechanism could, in principle, be used as a substitute for (now illegal) mandatory retirement.
terms that had been (presumably) optimally chosen. Any major change in the accumulation of pension benefits would likely also necessitate (costly) changes in wages and other benefits.
There is some evidence that defined-benefit pension plans have not been employed to "rescue" LSICs following the ban on mandatory retirement. In recent years there has been a shift away from defined-benefit pension plans altogether in favor of defined-contribution plans, which cannot support LSICs (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1992; Kruse, 1995; Ippolito, 1995 , 1999) . This trend suggests (but does not prove) that defined-benefit pension plans are not being modified on a wide scale in order to support LSICs.
B. Declining Benefits of LSICs
LSICs tend to make workers less likely to quit their jobs. In order to induce a worker who is party to an LSIC to quit, an outside job offer would not only need to be superior, but superior by enough to induce the worker to forfeit the "bond" that he expects to recoup in the form of overpayment when old. 13, 14 LSICs also tend to make firms less likely to dismiss workers. In the absence of an LSIC the firm will dismiss any worker who is not productive enough to justify his compensation. But firms that are party to LSICs retain some workers that the firm would prefer to dismiss because dismissal might be perceived as a violation of the LSIC. Since LSICs prevent some (efficient) separations, they tend to lead to relatively long job matches.
Since LSICs tend to limit efficient separations, anything that makes efficient separations more likely (i.e., anything that makes workers or firms more likely to prefer to separate), reduces the benefits of LSICs and so makes them less likely to be formed. Efficient separations are more likely when workers find moving less distasteful, because alternative job offers are more likely to be perceived as superior. They are also more likely when firms have access to technologies and/or organizational structures that are more flexible and therefore rely less heavily on firmspecific human capital. It is widely believed that both of these changes have taken place in recent decades.
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IV. Empirical Implications:
The purpose of this section is to develop empirically testable implications of the Hypothesis of this paper: that the formation of new LSICs between firms and young workers has declined or ceased.
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Let ρ(t) represent the fraction of new entrants to the workforce at time t who enter into LSICs.
Let t d represent the date at which the net benefits of LSICs began to decline. Assume that ρ(t) employee can simply demand the unpaid portion of an LSIC bond whenever he finds a better opportunity outside the firm. 15 There is substantial evidence of a decline in job stability for males over the last few decades. (See Jaeger & Stevens (1999) and Neumark, Polsky & Hansen (1999) , for evidence. See Stewart (1999) for a contrary view. Also see Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock & Scott (1999) for evidence specifically related to young males). This is consistent with an increase in worker mobility and/or a decrease in the importance of firm-specific human capital. The job stability literature is not directly on point, however, because it only reflects changes in the equilibrium frequency of job separations. This may be influenced by factors other than worker tastes and firm production processes. 16 In an earlier version of the paper, I tested the Hypothesis using an approach based on the one used by Lazear & Moore (1984) to demonstrate that LSICs did in fact exist. In that paper, the authors develop a modified version of Lazear's original theory so that it predicts a positive relationship between the slope of the age-earnings profile in an occupational category and lifetime earnings in that category. This positive relationship, if it exists, might be due to the presence of LSICs, or it might be the case that those occupational categories with steeper slopes have faster human capital accumulation, which leads to higher earnings. Lazear & Moore argue that data on self-employed workers can be used to purge the estimates (for wage and salary workers) of human capital accumulation effects since there are no incentive problems for self-employed workers. They argue that any remaining relationship between slope and lifetime earnings is due to LSICs. They used Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1978.
begins to decline at t d and continues to decline thereafter as workers and firms gradually adapt to the new environment. This means that, for all t > t d, there is an (increasing) number of "types" of workers who do not enter into LSICs, but who would have done so had they entered the workforce before t d . These types of workers have a different structure of compensation depending on when they entered the labor force.
This change in the structure of compensation for otherwise identical workers can generate testable empirical implications of the Hypothesis. If the rate of formation of LSICs among young workers entering the labor force is smaller after t d (and decreasing after that), then the proportion of workers in the economy who are party to LSICs must also be smaller after t d (and decreasing after that). Since LSICs tend to increase the returns to firm tenure, we can predict that average returns to firm tenure in the economy must decline after t d . This prediction can be tested, with no additional assumptions beyond those listed above, as long as the sample period includes some years after t d . The prediction can be stated as follows:
Prediction 1: Returns to firm tenure declined after t d .
This is not a strong test, as there are a number of alternative reasons why returns to firm tenure might decline over time. But a stronger test can also be performed. If the Hypothesis were correct, we would not expect this decline in the returns to firm tenure to be the same for all levels of experience: specifically, we would expect the decline in the returns to firm tenure to be greater for low-experience workers. To see this, consider two dates: one shortly before t d and one shortly after. The incidence of LSICs among high-tenure, high-experience workers will be I repeated their test on CPS data from every year from 1978-1999. While the results (available upon request) were consistent with the Hypothesis, a variety of empirical problems cast doubt on the validity of this approach.
the same on these two dates, while the incidence of LSICs for new entrants to the labor force (low-tenure, low-experience workers) will be smaller at the latter date. (The incidence of LSICs among low-tenure, high-experience workers is presumably low at both dates, as LSICs are not typically associated with older workers who start new jobs.) This means that, all else equal, the returns to firm tenure among high-experience workers (both high-tenure and low-tenure) should be the same on the two dates, whereas returns to firm tenure among low-experience workers should be lower in the later period. 17 This prediction can be stated as follows:
Prediction 2: The decline in the returns to firm tenure was greater for younger workers.
Note that testing Predictions 1 and 2 on a "full" sample of workers (including those who would not have been party to LSICs even before t d ) is conservative, as the predicted effects might be present but be attenuated by the presence of the other workers in the sample.
V. Data and Summary Statistics:
The data for this study come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID The main sample consists of male "heads" of households who are PSID sample members 18 and who are aged 25-54. Only these prime-age workers are included in order to avoid concerns related to the more erratic labor supply behavior of younger and older workers. Wages are deflated to 1976 dollars using the Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). A person-year is included in the sample if the individual is a full-time (more than 1500 hours)
worker in the private sector with hourly labor earnings greater than $1.50 who is not selfemployed. Government and unionized workers are excluded because they are difficult to fire;
since LSICs are based on the threat of firing, these workers are unlikely to be party to them.
Observations from the Survey of Economic Opportunity low-income over-sample are also excluded. Summary statistics are presented in Column 1 of Table 1 .
As discussed in the Appendix, the estimation approach that I use requires that the data for each individual be "partitioned" into different job matches. In other words, it is necessary to identify each job that an individual held during the sample period and to assign each observation to one of those jobs. It is not always obvious to which job match a particular observation belongs. Brown & Light (1992) show that biased coefficients on firm tenure (in wage equations using PSID data) can arise due to errors in assigning observations to job matches. They analyze a number of remedies for this, and recommend a partition (which they call partition "T") that 18 Not everyone in a PSID household is a sample member. The PSID collects data on all members of the household in which a sample member lives, which includes people who are not sample members. I only use data on sample members because the presence of non-members in the dataset depends on things like marriage and divorce, which can bias the sample.
assumes that a job change has occurred whenever reported tenure is less than the elapsed time since the previous interview. I follow their recommendation and use partition T.
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VI. Estimation and Main Results:
A. Estimation TEN is firm tenure, EXP is potential work experience (age-education-6), 20 TIME is a linear time trend, and X is a vector of standard control variables including four education dummies, a non-white dummy, an ever-married dummy, four region dummies, and 2-digit 1970 census industry and occupation dummies. 21 α and θ are individual specific and job-match specific effects, respectively, and ε is a noise term. The subscripts i, j, and t index the individual, the job match, and time, respectively. The reason for indexing the job will be made clear in the estimation section below.
Prediction 1 is that the effect of firm tenure on wages is declining over time, or: 19 Brown & Light also show that the tenure variable in the PSID must be "cleaned" in order for it to produce correct results. Specifically, it must be modified so that it is forced to increase at the same rate as the time variable (which is often not the case in the raw data). They evaluate a number of ways of doing this, and they find that all perform about equally well. I take the approach of assuming that reported tenure for the first year of each job match is correct, and then forcing tenure to increase by one year for each year of the job match. The potential experience variable is cleaned in a similar manner. 20 The PSID is not consistent in its questions about the number of years of post-graduate schooling. In order to use the full sample, I assign 16 years of schooling to someone whose highest education is an undergraduate degree, and 19 years to someone who reports a post-graduate degree. 0 ln 10 8
Prediction 2 is that this effect is less pronounced for more experienced workers, or:
There is considerable controversy regarding the correct method for estimating returns to firm tenure (Abraham & Farber, 1987; Altonji & Shokotko, 1987; Topel, 1991) . I follow Parent (2000) and use the instrumental variables (IV) approach of Altonji & Shokotko (described in the Appendix). Since the PSID follows individuals over time, there is an individual-specific component in the error term. In order to get the correct standard errors, a cluster correction is performed.
B. Main Results
Full-sample IV regression results for three different specifications of the wage equation are reported in Table 2 . Two sets of results are reported for each specification: one that includes dummies for the two-digit 1970 census industries and occupations, and one that does not. For comparison purposes, OLS results (for Specification 3 only) are reported as well. In this section I will discuss the Specification 3 IV results (with industry and occupation dummies included), which are the most important since Specification 3 corresponds to Equation 1 above.
The IV estimate of β 8 is -.0081 and IV estimate of β 10 is equal to .00035. Both of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level. These results confirm Prediction 1: returns to firm tenure have decreased on average.
22 They also confirm Prediction 2: the decline in returns to firm tenure is large for low-experience workers, but not for high-experience workers.
VII. Alternative Explanations and Additional Results:
As discussed above, the main empirical analysis confirms that tenure-earnings profiles have changed according to Predictions 1 and 2. But this does not necessarily constitute confirmation of the Hypothesis; it remains possible that the Hypothesis is false but that some other phenomenon has caused Predictions 1 and 2 to be confirmed. The purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which it is possible to be confident that the changes in tenure-earnings profile discussed above are due to the hypothesized cause rather than to some alternative one.
A. Alternative Explanations
The most obvious candidates for alternative explanations include changes in technology and in worker tastes for mobility. I consider each of these in turn:
1. Technology:
Suppose that technology changes at time t tech so that firm-specific human capital is less valuable than it was before. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that only low- 22 The functional form of Equation 1 imposes a linear relationship between the change in returns to tenure and experience, which means that, as long as β 10 > 0, the change in returns to tenure will eventually become positive. Since this relationship is positive only at high levels of potential experience, we can be confident that, on average, the change is negative. Another way to see this is to look at Specification 2, where the IV estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term between the time trend and the tenure variable is equal to -.0047, which is significant at the 5% level.
experience workers invest in firm-specific human capital and that the level of investment depends on the state of technology. Those workers who entered the work force after time t tech would have less firm-specific human capital (due to the reduced investment) and also a lower return (due to the technology change). Those workers who entered the work force before time t tech , on the other hand, would have an unchanged level of firm-specific human capital, but would still have a lower return. This technology-based explanation would generate both Prediction 1 (all workers have a decline in returns to firm tenure), and Prediction 2 (the decline in returns to firm tenure is larger for low-experience workers).
If the technology change were small, then the change in the average return to firm tenure would also be small. As can be seen in Specification 2, this is not the case: the coefficient on the interaction between firm tenure and the time trend is equal to -.0047, and is significant at the 5% level. In order for the technology explanation to be correct, the technology change during the sample period would have had to be substantial.
Tastes:
Suppose that tastes changes at time t taste so that low-experience workers object to changing jobs less than they had in the past. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that only low-experience workers invest in firm-specific human capital and that the level of investment depends on the worker's tastes (workers who believe that a preferred job opportunity is likely to come along invest less in firm-specific human capital). Those workers who entered the work force after time t taste would have less firm-specific human capital (due to the reduced investment) and an unchanged return. Those workers who entered the work force before time t taste , on the other hand, would have an unchanged level of firm-specific human capital and an unchanged return. This taste-based explanation would generate both Prediction 1 (on average, workers have a decline in returns to firm tenure), and Prediction 2 (the decline in returns to firm tenure is larger for low-tenure workers).
In order for this alternative explanation to be correct, it would have to be the case that this change in tastes was both substantial and that it took place within the relatively brief sample period.
In sum, there are plausible arguments in favor of alternative explanations for the fact that Propositions 1 and 2 were confirmed in the main empirical analysis. For this reason, I perform some additional tests that are intended to distinguish between these explanations.
B. Additional Tests
In order to further explore the question of whether the main results have some cause other than the hypothesized one, I perform the following exercise: I identify other groups in the data (both sub-groups of the full (male) sample and a separate female sample); determine whether or not, according to the Hypothesis, Predictions 1 and 2 are expected to hold for those groups; and then perform empirical tests similar to those performed on the main sample to see how well the Hypothesis holds up.
1. "White-Collar" and "Not White-Collar" Sub-Samples
To perform this test, I split the main (male) sample into two sub-samples. Ideally, one subsample would be defined as workers who would have entered into LSICs had they entered the workforce before t d (Category A), and the other sub-sample would be defined as workers who would not have done so (Category B). This division would permit the following test: if the Hypothesis were correct, we would expect Predictions 1 and 2 to hold for the Category A subsample, but not for the Category B sub-sample, because only in the Category A sub-sample is there a decline in the proportion of workers who are entering into LSICs: in the Category B subsample, no LSICs were being formed in the first place. As a practical matter, however, any actual division of the sample will only approximate this ideal division. This means that both sub-samples will contain some workers who would properly be assigned to Category A. For this reason, we would expect that Predictions 1 and 2 would hold to some extent for both subsamples, but would hold more strongly for the one that is intended to approximate Category A.
To understand what it means for the Predictions to hold "more strongly" for one sub-sample than for the other, consider the following thought experiment: suppose we had a perfect mechanism for assigning workers to the correct category. In this case, we would expect the following results (if the Hypothesis is correct): (i) there would be no change in the returns to tenure for workers in Category B, regardless of the level of experience; and (ii) there would be a decline in the returns to tenure for low-experience workers in Category A, but this decline would approach zero at high levels of experience. Since the functional form of Equation 1 imposes a linear relationship between the change in returns to tenure and experience, this corresponds to a decline in returns to tenure for low-experience workers, and an increase in returns to tenure for workers with sufficiently high experience. Figure 1 plots the predicted relationship between the change in returns to tenure and experience for the two "perfect" Categories. 23 If the estimation produced results such as those in Figure 1 , we would say that the Hypothesis holds for Category A, but not for Category B. In practice, the imperfect method for assigning workers to categories means that both sub-samples will contain some workers who would properly be assigned to Category A. This means that we would expect the Category B line to be upward sloping, but to start higher and have a flatter slope than the Category A line. See Figure 2 for an illustration. If the estimation produced results such as those in Figure 2 , we would say that the Hypothesis holds more strongly for Category A than for Category B
In order to split the sample in the manner described above, it is necessary to find some information that can serve as a proxy for a worker's propensity to be party to an LSIC. The most plausible proxy is a property of occupations, not of individuals. Specifically, LSICs are generally thought to be more likely to arise in occupations in which employee monitoring is difficult. I treat all workers in occupations in which monitoring is "difficult" as belonging to
Category A and all workers in occupations in which monitoring is not difficult as belonging to Category B. The idea behind this is that workers in occupations in which monitoring is not difficult were unlikely to be party to LSICs either before or after t d , whereas the percentage of workers who are in difficult-to-monitor occupations and who are party to LSICs should be decreasing after t d .
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To divide the occupations into those that are and are not difficult to monitor, I follow Valletta (1999) and assume that employee monitoring is difficult in "white-collar" occupations, but not in other occupations. I define a worker as white-collar if he is in a 1970 2-digit census occupation of 30 or less. These occupations are titled "Managerial and Professional Specialty
Occupations." 25 I omit job matches in which the worker's white-collar/not-white-collar status changes within the match. For this reason, the sum of the sample sizes of the two sub-samples is smaller than the sample size of the main sample (4802 vs. 6395). Summary statistics for the two sub-samples are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 .
Regression results for the white-collar and not-white-collar sub-samples are reported in Tables 3a and 3b . Two sets of results are reported for each specification: one that includes dummies for the two-digit 1970 census industries, and one that does not. Occupation dummies are omitted because the white-collar and not-white-collar categories are themselves derived from the occupation variable. For the white-collar sub-sample, the IV estimate of β 8 is equal to -.0047 in the specification that controls for industry, and is equal to -.0063 in the specification that does not. Neither of these coefficients is significant at conventional levels. The IV estimate of β 10 is equal to .00024 in the specification that controls for industry, and is equal to .00033 in the specification that does not. Neither of these coefficients is significant at conventional levels.
For the not-white-collar sub-sample, the IV estimate of β 8 is equal to -.0120 in the specification that controls for industry, and is equal to -.0133 in the specification that does not.
Both of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The IV estimate of the coefficient β 10 is equal to .00046 in the specification that controls for industry, and is equal to .00048 in the specification that does not. Both of these coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
25 I performed a similar exercise by splitting the sample between high and low levels of the "substantive complexity" of an occupation. The substantive complexity variable is a weighted average of a number of occupational characteristics as measured by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The DOT defines about 14,000 occupations and rates each one according to a large number of such characteristics. That is, it assigns each occupation a score for each characteristic. I follow Roos & Tremain (1980) in converting these scores from the DOT occupations to the 1970 3-digit census occupations. There are many more DOT occupations than there are 3-digit census occupations. The score for a given census occupation for each characteristic is the employment-weighted average of the scores of the constituent DOT occupations. An approach along these lines was first used by Hutchens (1987) to test for the existence of LSICs. The results for this sample division are similar to those for the "whitecollar" vs. "not-white-collar" division and so are not reported.
These coefficients all have the correct signs (though they are statistically insignificant in the white-collar sub-sample). Both sub-samples exhibit a decline in the returns to firm tenure for low-experience workers, and the magnitude of this decline diminishes with experience for both sub-samples. However, contrary to what we would expect if the Hypothesis were correct, these results hold more strongly for the not-white-collar sub-group. These results are illustrated in
Figures 3a (based on the specification that includes industry dummies) and in Figure 3b (based on the specification that does not).
The split-sample results do not support the Hypothesis (because the results were stronger for the not-white-collar sub-sample), but do not strongly refute it either (because both sets of coefficients had the correct signs). This lack of support may mean that they Hypothesis is false, or it may be a reflection of the weaknesses of the split-sample approach. These weaknesses include: (i) the crudeness of the method used to determine who is likely to be party to an LSIC,
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(ii) the imprecision of the regression results (particularly for the white-collar sub-sample), and (iii) the possibility that the two sub-groups had different experiences in terms of the accumulation of and/or returns to human capital during the sample period.
Female Sample
To perform this test, I use a sample of female workers. The female sample is defined in the same way as the male sample, except that it consists of female PSID household heads and of female "wives" who are married to male household heads. Summary statistics are presented in Column 4 of Table 1 . 26 Monitoring difficulty is only one factor that influences the likelihood that an LSIC will form. Other factors include the size and age of the firm (workers will only make implicit contracts with firms that are expected to be around decades in the future to honor them), the degree of intrinsic motivation of the employees (which might be As discussed above, LSICs are typically not associated with women. Therefore, confirmation of Predictions 1 and 2 for men, but not for women, would tend to support the Hypothesis. On the other hand, confirmation of Predictions 1 and 2 for women as well as men would suggest that the effects found above for men had some alternative cause that was common to men and women.
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Regression results for the female sample are reported in Table 4 . The PSID did not ask about the race of wives until 1985. For this reason, the non-white dummy is omitted from the female sample regressions. The IV estimate of β 8 is equal to -.0075 in the specification that controls for industry and occupation, and is equal to -.0051 in the specification that does not. The former coefficient is significant at the 5% level; the latter coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. The IV estimate of β 10 is equal to .00023 in the specification that controls for industry and occupation, and is equal to .00015 in the specification that does not. The former coefficient is significant at the 10% level; the latter coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.
If the Hypothesis is correct, the Predictions should hold for the main (male) sample, but not for the female sample; at least, the results should hold more strongly for the main sample. The
Predictions do hold more strongly for the main sample than for the female sample, but the strength of this result depends on the specification. Specifically, the result holds much more strongly for the specification that excludes the industry and occupation dummies; for the specification that includes industry and occupation dummies, the coefficients for the female sample are not significant at conventional levels. This may be because the difference between male and female tenure-earnings profiles is largely due to differences in their rates of participation in different industries and occupations: once these are controlled for, the differences higher in "better" jobs), and the complementarity between supervision and work (if the normal course of production involves close proximity between employee and supervisor then LSICs are less likely to be formed). 27 In principle, the possibility would remain that similar effects for the two genders had different causes, but this seems unlikely.
may be much smaller. For this reason, the specification that omits the industry and occupation dummies may be the preferred one. These results are illustrated in Figures 4a (based on the specification that includes industry dummies) and in Figure 4b (based on the specification that does not).
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VIII. Conclusions:
In this paper I develop the hypothesis that the formation of LSICs between firms and young workers has declined or ceased. I develop two testable Predictions of this Hypothesis (involving changes in the returns to firm tenure), and I test them on PSID data using the instrumental variables method developed by Altonji & Shokotko (1987) . The Predictions are confirmed in the full-sample results. I discuss two possible alternative scenarios in which the Predictions could be confirmed even if the Hypothesis were false. In order to differentiate between these competing explanations, I conduct additional tests. The split-sample results (in which the sample is divided into occupations that are more and less amenable to the formation of LSICs) do not support the Hypothesis, but do not strongly refute it either. It is unclear whether this lack of support indicates that the Hypothesis is false, or if it is merely a reflection of weaknesses in the splitsample approach. The female sample results support the Hypothesis, but the strength of this support depends on the regression specification. The mixed nature of these results leads me to conclude that the Hypothesis may be true, but that more research is necessary to reach a firm conclusion.
This paper makes no attempt to determine the relative contributions of legal and economic factors in the decline or demise of LSICs. Perhaps there would have been no decline had it not been for the legal ban on mandatory retirement. On the other hand, perhaps the benefits of LSICs were declining to the point that they would have eventually ceased to be formed even if mandatory retirement had remained legal. It is unclear whether the ban on mandatory retirement is the primary cause for the decline of LSICs, or if it is merely the trigger.
If in fact LSICs are no longer being formed with younger workers, a number of interesting things may come about as a result. It is widely believed that in the 1990s the U.S. entered a period of widespread corporate "downsizing" in which firms laid off workers --often welleducated workers with high tenure --to an extent far greater than in the past. Recent empirical studies have lent some support to this belief. This phenomenon may be due in part to the decline of LSICs for younger workers. If firms are no longer forming LSICs with young workers, then they have a diminished incentive to protect their reputations for trustworthiness and therefore have a greater incentive to renege on their obligations to older workers with LSICs by laying them off. I develop and test this argument in another paper (Balan, 2002) .
The demise of LSICs will tend to cause heavier reliance on alternative mechanisms for dealing with principal-agent problems. This may include more monitoring. It may also include heavier reliance on efficiency wages. In future research, I plan to investigate whether or not efficiency wages became more heavily used as LSICs declined.
the main sample in Figures 4a and 4b are based on the specification that omits the nonwhite variable.
Appendix: Altonji & Shokotko (1987) Approach to Estimating the Returns to Firm Tenure
Altonji & Shokotko (AS) consider a wage regression like the following (dropping the square terms for ease of presentation):
In this specification, the error term is decomposed into a person-specific fixed effect (ability) α i , a job-specific fixed effect (match quality) θ ij and a noise term ε ijt . The problem in estimating β 1 is that tenure is likely correlated with the error term. It is likely to be positively correlated with α i because high ability individuals or individuals with fewer health or personal problems are likely to have higher wages and lower turnover/higher tenure. It is also likely to be correlated with θ ij because workers who are getting high wages relative to their alternatives (which is more likely when θ ij is high) are not likely to quit. Similarly, firms that are getting some surplus from a worker (which is also more likely when θ ij is high) are not likely to lay him off. Both of these effects suggest a positive correlation between the tenure variables and θ ij . On the other hand, workers only quit if their alternative is better than their current job. A job with a very good match will tend to be negatively correlated with tenure to the extent that the better job enticed the worker to switch (and thereby lowered his tenure). AS maintain that overall the correlation between the tenure variables and θ ij (and hence the correlation between the tenure variables and the error term) is positive.
AS propose an instrumental variables approach to dealing with this problem. The principal instrument for the tenure variable is the deviation from the mean tenure for a job match. The tenure instrument is uncorrelated by construction with α i . To see this, imagine two individuals, one of high ability and the other of low ability. The high-ability individual will tend to have high tenure and the low-ability individual will tend to have low tenure. But neither is more likely than the other to have a high value of the tenure instrument because for every individual, every value that the instrument takes on is balanced by another value of the same magnitude and the opposite sign. A similar argument demonstrates that tenure is uncorrelated with θ ij . The tenure instrument is correlated with tenure. Within a given job, higher values of tenure always correspond to higher values of the instrument.
Experience might also be correlated with the error term. People with a higher value for the individual fixed effect α i might have fewer or shorter unemployment spells and hence more experience. People with more experience might have a higher value for the job match specific error component θ ij since they have had more time to search for a good job match. But this is not an issue when potential experience is used. Notes: a. The full sample, the "white-collar" sub-sample, and the "not white-collar" sub-sample consist of male household "heads" who are PSID sample members between 25 and 54 years of age who have full-time, private-sector, non-union jobs and who are not self-employed. The "female" sample is similar but consists of female household heads and of "wives." b. Standard deviations in parentheses. c. Note that the sum of the observations in the male sub-samples is less than the number of observations in the full male sample. This is because the sub-samples do not include matches where the status changes within the match. c. The full sample consists of male household "heads" who are PSID sample members between 25 and 54 years of age who have full-time, private sector, non-union jobs and who are not self-employed. d. Unreported regressors include four education dummies, a nonwhite dummy, an ever-married dummy, and four region dummies. The "With Industry and Occupation Dummies" Specifications also include 2-digit 1970 census industry and occupation dummies. e. Standard errors are in parentheses. f. A clustering correction is made allowing the error terms for the observations of an individual to be correlated. g. One, two, and three stars indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Notes: a. Dependent variable is log of hourly labor earnings. b. IV results are reported for Specifications 1 -3. OLS results are reported for Specification 3 only. c. The "white-collar" sample consists of male household "heads" who are PSID sample members between 25 and 54 years of age who have full-time, private sector, non-union jobs, who are not self-employed, and who work in "Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations." d. Unreported regressors include four education dummies, a nonwhite dummy, an ever-married dummy, and four region dummies. The "With Industry Dummies" Specifications also include 2-digit 1970 census industry dummies. e. Standard errors are in parentheses. f. A clustering correction is made allowing the error terms for the observations of an individual to be correlated. g. One, two, and three stars indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(3)
Without Industry Dummies With Industry Dummies Notes: a. Dependent variable is log of hourly labor earnings. b. IV results are reported for Specifications 1 -3. OLS results are reported for Specification 3 only. c. The "not white-collar" sample consists of male household "heads" who are PSID sample members between 25 and 54 years of age who have full-time, private sector, non-union jobs, who are not self-employed, and who do not work in "Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations." d. Unreported regressors include four education dummies, a nonwhite dummy, an ever-married dummy, and four region dummies. The "With Industry Dummies" Specifications also include 2-digit 1970 census industry dummies. e. Standard errors are in parentheses. f. A clustering correction is made allowing the error terms for the observations of an individual to be correlated. g. One, two, and three stars indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Notes: a. Dependent variable is log of hourly labor earnings. b. IV results are reported for Specifications 1 -3. OLS results are reported for Specification 3 only. c. The full sample consists of female household "heads" and "wives" who are PSID sample members between 25 and 54 years of age who have full-time, private sector, non-union jobs and who are not self-employed. d. Unreported regressors include four education dummies, an ever-married dummy, and four region dummies. The "With Industry and Occupation Dummies" Specifications also include 2-digit 1970 census industry and occupation dummies. e. Standard errors are in parentheses. f. A clustering correction is made allowing the error terms for the observations of an individual to be correlated. g. One, two, and three stars indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Potential Experience Change in Return to Firm Tenure
